Platform and infrastructure competition after Android Auto

Konstantinos Stylianou

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement

Konstantinos Stylianou, ’Platform and infrastructure competition after Android Auto’ (2026) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (jnag007 - advance)

Publication Date: 2 July 2026

Abstract

On 25 February 2025, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the Android Auto case, remaking the core doctrine around how dominant undertakings relate to their competitors and the extent to which they have an obligation to assist them, namely the refusal to deal doctrine. Despite the good intention to update a notoriously strict doctrine for the digital economy (if not more broadly), the Court may have moved too far too fast. This article critically assesses the new refusal to deal doctrine, its relationship with past caselaw, its tension with platform literature, and its interaction with the Digital Markets Act, with which it overlaps. Crucially, it also proposes simple ways by which the new test could have been better calibrated while at the same time still allowing the Court to achieve its objectives.