Professor Julie Clarke
Research | Publications | Submissions | Media
Books
Books (edited)
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“Marking the 50-year anniversary of modern statutory competition law in Australia, this two-volume set brings together more than 40 leading experts to discuss the most important issues and developments arising under Australian competition law, economics, and policy.
This publication discusses current reforms and reviews the impact of competition law and policy in the Australian economy over the last 50 years, since the enactment of the Trade Practices Act 1974. Contributors examine the legacy of this landmark legislation, important precedents and cases that have shaped contemporary Australian competition law, as well as the substantive, procedural, and institutional features in need of revision. Volume I focuses on the history and context of Australian competition law, the courts and tribunal, and the competition system established by the Competition and Consumer Act. Volume II assesses consumer protection law, the digital economy, enforcement, remedies and sanctions, and the Australian competition regime from a comparative perspective.
This volume, alongside its companion, Competition and Consumer Law: Principles, Enforcement, and Comparative Perspectives, is an authoritative treatise that will interest the broader competition law and policy community around the world. Together, they provide essential insights for academics, researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and regulators.”
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“Marking the 50th anniversary of modern statutory competition law in Australia, this two-volume set brings together more than 40 leading experts to discuss the most important issues and developments arising under Australian competition law, economics, and policy.
This publication discusses current reforms and reviews the impact of competition law and consumer law in the Australian economy over the last 50 years, since the enactment of the Trade Practices Act 1974. Contributors examine the legacy of this landmark legislation, important precedents and cases that have shaped contemporary Australian competition law, as well as the substantive, procedural, and institutional features in need of revision. Volume I focuses on the history and context of Australian competition law, the courts and tribunal, and the competition system established by the Competition and Consumer Act. Volume II discusses key issues relating to consumer protection law, the digital economy, enforcement, remedies, and sanctions. It also considers the Australian competition regime from a comparative perspective.
This volume, alongside its companion, The Competition Law System: Context, Law and Economics, is an authoritative treatise that will interest the broader competition law and policy community around the world. Together, they provide essential insights for academics, researchers, practitioners, consumer associations, policymakers, and regulators.”
Books (textbooks)
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31 July 2026
Now in its Eighth Edition, Australian Consumer Law: Commentary and Materials is an up-to-date and comprehensive treatment of all key provisions in the Australian Consumer Law and the related provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act. Areas covered include the general prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct, the specific protections against unfair practices, unconscionable conduct and unfair contract terms, the consumer guarantees regime applicable to goods and services, product safety and the liability of manufacturers of unsafe goods. There is also detailed coverage of private and public remedies, the enforcement powers of regulatory agencies and of organisational and personal liability. Reference is also made to the scourge of scamming as it affects Australian consumers, the work of the ACCC in this area and potential consumer issues arising from the rapid advances occurring in the field of AI. The careful selection of cases and statutory provisions, combined with detailed expert commentary, makes the book an essential resource for students of Australian Consumer Law as well as practitioners in this area.
This edition has been thoroughly revised and updated to incorporate reference to new or foreshadowed developments...
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Philip Clarke and Julie Clarke, Contract Law: Commentaries, Cases and Perspectives, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2016
Contract Law introduces students to the fundamental principles, theories and arguments in Australian contract law. It provides a carefully selected collection of cases, statutes and materials with insightful commentary designed to give students a thorough understanding of the subject. A detailed introduction is presented in each chapter to clearly set the scene for subsequent materials and commentary and key extracts from leading cases help make contract law engaging and accessible to all readers. Also featured are international perspectives throughout, including comparisons with Indian and Chinese contact law.
Earlier editions:
Philip Clarke and Julie Clarke, Contract Law: Commentaries, Cases and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2012 (2nd edition)
Philip Clarke, Julie Clarke and Ming Zhou, Contract Law: Commentaries, Cases and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2008
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Philip Clarke and Julie Clarke, Contract Law: Commentaries, Cases and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2012 (2nd edition)
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Philip Clarke, Stephen Corones and Julie Clarke, Competition Law and Policy - Cases and Materials, OUP, 3rd edn, 2011
Competition Law and Policy: Cases and Materials outlines and evaluates Australian competition law and its policy rationale. This fully revised third edition draws together a comprehensive collection of material, providing an excellent and up-to-date guide to Australian competition law and current proposals for change. The book begins with an overview of Australia’s competition policies and goals and of the evolution of its common law. The text then systematically discusses the principle forms of anti-competitive conduct engaged in by firms. Finally, it looks at the uniquely Australian concepts of authorisation and access and the sanctions imposed for breaches of competition law.
Philip Clarke, Stephen Corones and Julie Clarke
Oxford University Press, July 2011ISBN
9780195562897Pages
747 -
Philip Clarke, Julie Clarke and Ming Zhou, Contract Law: Commentaries, Cases and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2008
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Julie Clarke, Mirko Bagaric, James McConvill and Richard Edney, International Commercial Law: Principles and Practice, Pearson, 2006 (314 pages)
International Commercial Law: Principles and practices considers the multifaceted nature of international commercial law and explains the rules, principles, policies and practices that comprise this area of law and the wide-ranging influences that shape it.
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Philip Clarke, Julie Clarke and Nadine Courmadias, Contract Law - Casebook Companion, Butterworths 3rd ed, 2005 (316 pages)
Contract Law is designed for students who have no previous knowledge of contract law. The book covers all aspects of contract law, including: the nature and development of contract law; agreement; consideration; intention to create legal relations; capacities and formalities; terms and their construction; matters rendering a contract void, voidable or unenforceable; performance and termination; remedies; and solving contract problems.
Earlier edition: Philip Clarke, Roger Gamble and Julie Brebner, Contract Law - Casebook Companion, Butterworths 2nd ed, 2000
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Philip Clarke, Roger Gamble and Julie Brebner, Contract Law - Casebook Companion, Butterworths 2nd ed, 2000
Book chapters
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Julie Clarke, ‘‘Mergers, Part I: A Shifting Enforcement Framework’ in Mel Marquis and Julian Scarff (eds), Australian Competition Law in a Changing Context: A Handbook for Research, Teaching and Practice (Thomson Reuters, 2026)
This chapter highlights the distinctive nature of merger law and enforcement in a competition law system, with its forward-looking focus on market structures and their impact on competition. It focuses on the revolutionary change to merger enforcement in Australia and the national and international conditions that have precipitated the change.
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“Drawing together a variety of perspectives, this accessible yet comprehensive Research Handbook provides an in-depth analysis of the most significant issues pertaining to the legal regulation of cartels. An interdisciplinary team of respected experts explores the theoretical, legal, economic, political, and comparative discourse surrounding cartel regulation.”
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The rise of digital platforms in the past decade has sparked vigorous debate about the effectiveness of existing competition laws in the ‘new economy’. The digital platform giants now account for the majority of the world’s most valuable companies. They include the FAAMG companies, Facebook, Apple, Amazon and Microsoft and Google (Alphabet) as well as Chinese technology giants, Tencent and Alibaba. It is therefore unsurprising that they continue to attract unprecedented public, political and regulatory attention, prompting a raft of reviews and inquiries around the globe, changes to legal regimes and a growing number of mega-lawsuits.
Digital platforms present unique challenges for competition authorities, most acute where the platforms are conglomerate, multi-sided, vertically integrated and exhibit network effects. The complexities of market definition and competition assessment in such cases is readily apparent, especially where one side of the platform receives goods or services at zero financial cost.
This chapter considers how Australia’s re-designed misuse of market power prohibition might tackle the challenges produced by the rise of digital platforms. The more fundamental question of whether law and policy should change to address the social concerns enlivened by the rise of digital platforms is largely left to be examined in other chapters within this collection.
The chapter begins by identifying the characteristics of digital platforms which give rise to potential competition concerns. It then explains the current state of Australia’ misuse of market power law, before examining the types of platform conduct that might trigger enforcement action.
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For much of the early part of the last decade, the focus of Australian cartel law and enforcement was on the introduction and implementation of a criminal regime for cartel conduct, a reform supported by the Professor Bob Baxt AO consistent with his long-standing advocacy of effective enforcement of competition law during his tenure as a leading academic and practitioner in the field and as Chairman of the (then) Trade Practices Commission. Following a protracted debate about their terms and implications, cartel offences were enacted in 2009. For the ACCC, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions office (CDPP) and Federal Court, a period of substantial upskilling and adjustment to prepare for investigations and prosecutions of the new offences ensued. 2017 saw the first criminal sentencing of a corporation since the cartel offences became law: see CDPP v Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (‘NYK’). Further prosecutions, including of individuals, were foreshadowed for the near future, and the first of these were announced in February 2018.
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Under Professor Jenny’s astute leadership, the OECD’s Competition Division has made a major contribution to a worldwide discourse regarding effective sanctions for cartel conduct. In many instances, the insights and recommendations produced by the OECD have generated significant reforms in individual jurisdictions. This chapter focuses on corporate fines for collusion and uses the Australian experience and its interaction with the OECD in this area to highlight the influence of the intergovernmental organisation on national reform debates. The debate in this jurisdiction has been prompted by the opportunity provided by the OECD for the constructive sharing of information and experience amongst competition authorities that characterises so much of its work. Should the OECD’s recommendations for fine-setting reform be adopted, it would represent a significant turning point for the future effectiveness of the Australian sanctions regime.
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The globalisation of markets, combined with the extraordinary expansion of merger control laws over the past two decades, has resulted in an increasing number of mergers inviting multiple regulatory responses. This has had a significant impact on the complexity, time and cost associated with transnational mergers and has highlighted the differences in law, policy and procedure employed by more than 70 jurisdictions now adopting targeted merger regimes.
By contrast with other areas of competition law and policy, the treatment of mergers involves a significant regulatory component, with most jurisdictions adopting ex ante notification and suspension obligations for mergers exceeding defined thresholds. The justification for this lies in the structural change to the market affected by the merging of assets, personnel and intellectual property, which are difficult to reverse. However, ex ante regulation also has the consequence of subjecting the vast majority of benign or beneficial mergers to the cost and delay associated with administrative scrutiny.
This cost and delay has the potential to jeopardise time-sensitive transactions or postpone expected efficiency gains. Where markets extend beyond domestic borders, these costs are multiplied and the slowest and most prescriptive jurisdiction will influence or determine the time at which the merger can close, if at all, and on what conditions.
Achieving the optimal balance between preserving the integrity of the relevant market, while keeping to a minimum the costs incurred by parties and agencies in the review of lawful mergers, is one of the greatest challenges facing the international competition law community in relation to merger control.
Meeting this challenge demands increased levels of convergence on policy, law and, most importantly, procedure. More importantly, however, it requires increased cooperation in relation to mergers affecting markets which transcend national borders. Although there have been substantial efforts towards convergence and cooperation in merger review over the past decade, particularly through the work of the OECD and the International Competition Network (ICN), important differences remain, highlighted in recent years by the emergence of new and significant ex ante merger regimes, most notably in China, India and Brazil.
This chapter examines the existing similarities and differences in the purpose, substance and administration of merger control regimes and examines the potential for enhanced convergence and increased international cooperation in merger review in the future.
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Australian Law Dictionary, OUP, 2009
Contributing author on the following topics: consumer, disclaimer, horizontal agreements, predatory pricing
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‘Competition Law’ in Richard Krever (ed), Mastering Law Studies and Law Exam Techniques, LexisNexis Butterworths (9th edn, 2016; 8th edn, 2014)
Articles, working papers and notes
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Julie Clarke, ‘Resale price maintenance: a revival?’ (2026) 34 AJCCL (forthcoming)
This note explores recent public enforcement approaches to RPM and places them in historical context. It begins by briefly outlining the prohibition and the authorisation and notification process, before reviewing recent cases, administrative resolutions and public benefit assessments. Although it is impossible to draw conclusions about the level of RPM activity, the recent increase in administrative resolutions for RPM conduct is consistent with concerns raised by the ACCC about increased prevalence of unlawful RPM activity.
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After years of lobbying from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the ACCC) the Australian Government has introduced the 'Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024' (Cth) ('Bill') that, if passed, will revolutionise the way in which mergers are reviewed in Australia. Most notably, it will transform Australia's merger regime from a judicial enforcement system, supported by an informal, voluntary, non-suspensory notification process, to an administrative system supported by a formal mandatory and suspensory notification process. The ACCC will become the initial decision-maker for notified mergers, with the possibility of limited merits review to the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal).
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The full Federal Court’s recent decision in 'Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v NSW Ports Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd' is the latest to consider the principles and evidentiary issues surrounding the concept of “purpose” in Australian competition law. The Court unanimously rejected the ACCC’s appeal, finding that compensation provisions entered into as part of the privatisation of the Port of Botany and Port Kembla did not have the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition. The Court also rejected the appeal on the threshold issue of derivative Crown immunity. This note considers the “purpose” aspect of the case. It begins by identifying the role of purpose in Australian competition law and the set of principles that have developed to guide its interpretation and application. It then examines how the court navigated the issue of purpose in the NSW Ports case and concludes with some thoughts on implications for future cases.
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Australia’s merger control regime has returned to spotlight following recent statements by Rod Sims, Chair of Australia’s Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), that Australia’s current merger laws are ‘failing to adequately protect competition’. Concern about the effectiveness of merger laws in preventing anti-competitive structural changes is not new, nor is it confined to Australia. There has been a flurry if international statements, reviews and legislative measures directed toward addressing increases in market concentration and highlighting the challenges of predictive tests involving the acquisition of nascent competitors in dynamic markets.
In Australia, the ACCC’s intention to advocate for merger reform has been flagged for several years. In a 2017 speech Sims noted the increased complexity of mergers subject to public review and the evidentiary challenges confronting litigation in this area. In 2019 the ‘growing debate’ internationally about whether competition is ‘adequately protected by the forward-looking substantial lessening of competition test applied to mergers’ was highlighted and, in the same year, the Digital Platforms Report identified concerns about the ability of existing merger laws to capture strategic acquisitions of nascent rivals by digital platforms. Similar remarks have been made in subsequent public comments culminating in a speech in August 2021 in which Sims outlined proposals for the most substantial merger reform since the law was enacted The proposals are high level and are intended to ‘start a debate’ on merger reform, but it is clear that there is no longer an appetite for tinkering around the edges of merger reform; a fundamental overhaul of how mergers are reviewed in Australia is demanded.
Briefly, the ACCC recommends:
the introduction of a mandatory, suspensory, pre-merger notification regime administered and adjudicated by the ACCC;
a series of changes to the law designed to increase focus on structural changes brought about by mergers;
a reversal of the onus of proof in cases where the acquisition entrenches, materially increases or extends positions of substantial market power; and
the introduction of new ex ante regulation for acquisitions involving certain digital platforms.
This note examines each of these ACCC’s proposals for merger reform.
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Resale price maintenance (RPM) has been the subject of strict prohibition in Australia since the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1971 (‘1971 Act’) introduced a per se prohibition on minimum RPM, coupled with an option for exemption. When this Act was replaced by the current Act in 1974 the RPM prohibition was re-enacted in substantially the same form; the key changes being to extend the definition of RPM and remove the possibility for exemption. The prohibition has since been extended to capture services as well as goods and attempts to make it subject to a competition test, rather than a per se offence have been resisted. However, recognising that it may not always be harmful, an exemption in respect of RPM between related companies has been created and most importantly, the Act’s authorisation process has been extended to RPM, as has the quicker and cheaper notification process.
This note reviews those developments and examines the ACCC’s approach to public benefit claims with respect to RPM. Briefly, its conclusions are that the ACCC will be particularly concerned with public detriments in the form of reduced intra-brand price competition and will require the applicant to provide clear evidence of substantial public benefit before granting authorisation, or allowing a notification to stand.
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Between 2017-2019 the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission conducted a ‘world first’ inquiry into digital platforms and their impact on media and advertising services markets. Its focus was Google and Facebook reflecting their ‘influence, size and significance’ in Australia. Concluding that these platforms have market power, the Final Report makes a raft of recommendations traversing competition, consumer, privacy, media and broader public interest concerns.
In the competition space, minor recommendations were made with respect to Australia’s merger laws and processes and a targeted recommendation is made that Google remove default search and browser preferences from Android devices. The Report also calls for the establishment of a specialist ACCC branch tasked with pro-active monitoring and enforcement and armed with compulsory information gathering powers to conduct market inquiries and make recommendations to government.
Many of the Reports’ recommendations call for further consultation, including the development of several ‘codes of conduct’. It is clear that the focus on addressing the rise of the digital platforms in Australia has only just begun.
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The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) recently succeeded in its first ‘gun jumping’ case, with the Federal Court declaring that Cryosite Limited (Cryosite) had engaged in cartel conduct when it entered into and gave effect to an asset sale agreement prior to the proposed closure date. The case highlights the importance of merging parties avoiding coordination of their business activities in the lead up to mergers or acquisitions.
The Cryosite decision came amid an increase in gun jumping enforcement activity internationally, coupled with an increase in the fines imposed for gun jumping infringements.
This note briefly outlines the nature and scope of gun jumping risks for merging parties in Australia and internationally and the rationale of these laws. It then examines litigation involving Cryosite and subsequent guidance issued by the ACCC and the implications for business.
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Mirko Bagaric, Julie Clarke and William Rininger, 'Plea Bargaining: From Patent Unfairness to Transparent Justice' (2019) 84(1) Missouri Law Review 1-46 (84 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (2019)) (also available at SSRN)
The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented mass incarceration crisis. It imprisons more of its citizens than any other country—and by a considerable margin. It is now widely acknowledged that there is no community dividend stemming from an overly punitive sentencing system. Over-incarceration does not make the community safer and diverts billions of dollars annually from productive social services, such as health and education. Lawmakers have failed to find overarching solutions to this crisis. This Article proposes to change that paradigm by offering concrete reforms to a key failing of the sentencing system ...
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Caron Beaton-Wells and Julie Clarke, ‘Deterrent Penalties for Corporate Colluders: Lifting the Bar’ (2018) 37(1) University of Queensland Law Journal107-125
A critical review of corporate pecuniary penalties for cartel conduct in Australia is timely if not overdue. Debates about the role of individual sanctions notwithstanding, financial penalties against corporations remain the predominant means of sanctioning cartel conduct in this country as elsewhere. These sanctions are therefore the primary mechanism by which deterrence is sought to be achieved. Consistent with the international position, deterrence has long been accepted as the primary, if not exclusive, rationale for cartel sanctions in Australia.
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The full Federal Court recently handed down its long-awaited decision in the Pfizer competition case. The Court dismissed the ACCC’s appeal against Justice Flick’s decision that Pfizer did not misuse its market power or engage in prohibited exclusive dealing in the lead-up to the expiry of its patent over the blockbuster cholesterol-lowering drug, atorvastatin, marketed by Pfizer as ‘Lipitor’.
This note examines the key aspects of the decision and its implications for the strategies employed by pharmaceutical companies as their patents approach expiration.
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Moves are afoot to review the approach taken to assessment of civil penalties for contraventions of Australia’s competition laws. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has made it clear that penalties are being set at levels too low to effectively deter and the OECD has recently published a report confirming that Australia has failed to keep pace with international trends in this field over the last decade. This paper contributes to the debate, with a particular focus on the level of and method for setting financial penalties for corporations for cartel conduct. It presents detailed statistics on the level of corporate financial penalties imposed from the time of enactment of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 to December 2017. It draws comparisons with corporate fines imposed in other jurisdictions, highlighting the substantial gap between Australia and major jurisdictions, the European Union and United States especially. The paper compares and critically analyses the approach taken in Australia and that taken in many other jurisdictions to penalty assessment and makes a series of recommendations calling for reforms that would shift the dial towards more effective deterrence in this jurisdiction.
Keywords: Cartels, Penalties, Fines, Sanctions, Competition Law, Antitrust, Enforcement
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Julie Clarke, 'Australia: Harper Reforms’ (2018) 39(5) European Competition Law Review N57-59
On 6 November 2017 significant reforms to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (the CCA) commenced. These were contained in two Acts of Parliament: the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Act 2017 (MMP Act) and the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Act 2017 (CPR Act) which, together, represent the culmination of a major independent policy review (the Competition Policy Review) that reported in 2015.
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The Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Act 2017 (Cth) will give effect to the Harper Report recommendation to introduce an effects test for Australia’s misuse of market power prohibition to replace the existing purpose-based test. Commencement of the effects test is contingent on the passage of the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Bill 2016. This proposed change has generated more political debate and public commentary than any other aspect of the proposed Harper reforms.
This article examines the convoluted process that has led to the introduction of the effects test, before identifying the object of Australia’s misuse of market power law and examining the existing and proposed laws against that objective. It concludes that the existing law is misdirected as a matter of policy and is ineffective in practice. The proposed law will, by removing the “take advantage” element and shifting the focus from competitors to competition, be more aligned with the object of the provision and with international best practice.
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Rebates are a ubiquitous form of price competition which can be utilized either to intensify or to harm competition. Distinguishing pro-competitive from anti-competitive rebates and translating this into effective and administrable legal rules, remains a key challenge for competition law. The recent Opinion by Advocate General Wahl in the Intel appeal has identified deficiencies in the legal approach to dominant firm rebates under Article 102 TFEU and has proposed a ‘more economic’ case-by-case approach to their assessment. The proposed approach and the attempt by AG Wahl to reconcile it with existing case-law, raises a number of important questions for consideration by the European Court of Justice. This article examines AG Wahl’s Opinion and suggests that, while the substance of the proposed approach has merit, the form proposed is deficient in a number of respects.
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Competition law cases before the High Court are relatively rare. Cartel rulings from the High Court are rarer still. It is therefore notable that the High Court has made two determinations in relation to cartel conduct in the past 12 months. ...
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Julie Clarke, ‘Australia: Anti-competitive agreements’ (2017) 38(12) European Competition Law Review N-134-N135
The Japanese shipping company, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK), recently became the first company to be convicted and fined for cartel conduct under criminal cartel laws introduced in Australia in 2009.
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Julie Clarke ‘Australia: Anti-competitive agreements (Air Cargo) ‘(2017) 38(11) European Competition Law Review N-133-N134
On 14 June 2017 the High Court of Australia (Australia’s highest court) dismissed appeals by Air New Zealand Ltd and PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (the airlines) concerning claims of collusion in respect of international air cargo surcharges and other fees. The focus of the appeal was not on whether collusion occurred, but rather whether it occurred in a “market in Australia”. The High Court unanimously held that it did, notwithstanding that the decision as to choice of airline (the “switching decision”) took place at the country of departure, outside Australia.
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Julie Clarke ‘Australia: Mergers’ (Tabcorp) (2017) 38(11) European Competition Law Review N-133-N134
On 22 June 2017 the Australian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) authorised the proposed acquisition by Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (Tabcorp) of Tatts Group Ltd (Tatts). Tabcorp and Tatts are two of Australia’s largest gambling companies. The authorisation was granted on public benefit, rather than competition, grounds.
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On 1 May 2015 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia ruled that it was not permissible for parties to make joint submissions as to the appropriate ‘pecuniary penalty’ to be imposed: Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCAFC 59 (1 May 2015) (CFMEU). This decision has significant implications for the existing common practice of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and respondents to make agreed joint submissions as to appropriate pecuniary penalties in competition law cases.
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On 5 December 2014 the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) granted its first authorisation in relation to resale price maintenance (RPM). RPM is per se prohibited in Australia. Although an authorisation (exemption) mechanism for RPM, determined on public benefits grounds, has been available in Australia since 1995, this application was the first to be made to the ACCC.
The authorisation application was made by Tooltechnic Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd (Tooltechnic), an importer and wholesaler of Festool power tools in Australia. Tooltechnic claimed that the specialised and complex nature of its products necessitated high levels of service and that this service provision was being put at risk by the ‘free riding’ practices of some of its retailers.
The ACCC accepted that there was market failure caused by the free riding of some existing Festool retailers. It concluded that, while there was public detriment associated with the proposed RPM conduct, this was likely to be limited (in particular due to Tooltechnic’s limited market share and the highly differentiated nature of the products) and, on balance, the likely public benefits associated with improved pre-and post-sales services (which would be encouraged by the proposed RPM conduct) would outweigh this detriment. On this basis authorisation was granted for a period of four years, subject to some reporting obligations.
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The Australian Federal Court recently handed down a decision relating to the international air cargo cartel (the Air NZ case). Despite finding that the defendants, Air New Zealand Limited (Air NZ) and PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (Garuda), had engaged in price fixing conduct which might have affected prices in Australia, Justice Perram held that there was no contravention of Australian competition law because the conduct did not take place in a ‘market in Australia’. It is not yet known whether the ACCC will appeal the decision.
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On 25 June 2014 the Australian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) handed down its first direct authorisation decision, approving the AU$1.505 billion acquisition by AGL Energy Limited of the assets of Macquarie Generation (MacGen), a state-owned corporation (AGL-MacGen). The authorisation decision followed advice from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ( ACCC) that it would oppose the proposed deal. The Tribunal disagreed with the ACCC’s assessment of the likely anti-competitive impact of the merger and also considered that there were public benefits associated with the proposal that justified allowing it to proceed. On 3 Sept 2014 AGL announced it completed the $1,505 million acquisition of MacGen assets from the NSW Government.
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The prohibition of RPM occupies a special position in Australian competition law. It was the first anticompetitive practice to be specifically outlawed when Australian competition law commenced in earnest in the 1970s, is a per se offense, has been expanded in scope rather than curtailed, and, unlike most other jurisdictions, is not inhibited by the requirement that there be an agreement to fix a resale price. …
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In June 2013 the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) released new Authorisation Guidelines (new Guidelines). These replace the 2007 Guide to Authorisation (as updated by a 2011 addendum) (2007 Guide) and reflect the current approach taken by the ACCC to authorising otherwise anti-competitive conduct.
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In July 2009 Australia’s new cartel laws entered into force. On 19 March 2013 the Federal Court of Australia (Gordon J) handed down its first decision involving these new laws. Norcast S.ár.L( Norcast), a subsidiary of the private equity fund, Pala Investments Limited (Pala), alleged that Castle Harlan, Inc (Castle Harlan), another private equity fund, and Bradken Limited (Bradken) had entered into an arrangement whereby Castle Harlan would bid for the acquisition of Norcast’s subsidiary, NWS, and Bradken would not. Castle Harlan bid successfully for NWS and acquired it through its subsidiary, BC. Bradken Operations Pty Ltd (Bradken’s subsidiary) then exercised rights, acquired pursuant to a Subscription, Governance and Purchase Agreement (SGPA), to acquire all shares in BC and thereby acquired NWS. The parties and details surrounding the agreement are represented in the diagram below. …
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Trying to predict the future is like trying to drive down a country road at night with no lights while looking out the back window.” Predicting the path of Australian competition law in 2013 may be more difficult still. It is an election year in Australia and, if history is any guide, this will generate some populist political promises, frequently at odds with sound competition policy. …
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Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the trend towards the criminalization of hard core cartel conduct and to consider the appropriateness and effectiveness of extending the criminal law to this conduct. In addition, it will consider some of the legal implications, including the exposure of directors of companies to potential racketeering charges.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper first examines cartel theory and the justification for prohibition. The paper then identifies the emerging trend toward criminalization of hard core cartel conduct, followed by an assessment of potential justifications for criminalization. Implications of criminalization, including the potential impact of organized crime legislation on offenders and regulators, will then be considered.
Findings
There is a clear trend towards the criminalization of hard core cartels. The paper argues that this trend is appropriate, both because of the moral culpability it attracts and because of its potential to enhance general deterrence. The paper also argues that cartel conduct, in jurisdictions in which it is criminalized, will constitute “organized crime” as defined in the Palermo Convention and, as such, expose participants to potential money laundering and asset forfeiture consequences.
Originality/value
This paper is of value to governments and regulators considering adoption or implementation of a criminal cartel regime and to practitioners in advising clients about potential consequences of cartel conduct within a criminal regime.
Keywords:
Cartel conduct, Organized crime, Criminalization
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Julie Clarke, 'Unconscionable Conduct: an evolving moral judgment' (September/October 2011) 106 Precedent: Australian Plaintiff Lawyers Association Journal 30-35
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Radical changes to the Trade Practices Act have the potential to affect significantly, the ability of businesses to engage in vigorous price competition. These changes are designed to prohibit what is colloquially referred to as predatory pricing; the practice of a firm temporarily reducing its prices to a level designed to eliminate its competitors so that, free of competition, it can thereafter, lift them to supra-competitive levels. Unfortunately, because of its scope and the ambiguous new concepts it employs, the section has the potential to apply to all forms of vigorous price competition and creates significant risks for those businesses who seek to compete with their rivals by systematically, or irregularly, selling at lower prices than they do. This note examines the section's nature and scope and identifies the pitfalls that it presents for such firms.
[Re-publication of earlier paper]
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Radical changes to the Trade Practices Act (brought about by the 'Birdsville Amendments') have the potential to affect significantly, the ability of businesses to engage in vigorous price competition. These changes are designed to prohibit what is colloquially referred to as predatory pricing; the practice of a firm temporarily reducing its prices to a level designed to eliminate its competitors so that, free of competition, it can thereafter, lift them to supra-competitive levels. Unfortunately, because of its scope and the ambiguous new concepts it employs, the section has the potential to apply to all forms of vigorous price competition and creates significant risks for those businesses who seek to compete with their rivals by systematically, or irregularly, selling at lower prices than they do. This note examines the section's nature and scope and identifies the pitfalls that it presents for such firms.
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Corporate mergers whose effects transcend national borders have faced increasing regulation over the past few decades as more jurisdictions have developed merger laws and imposed re-merger notification requirements. The level of regulatory response to multi-jurisdictional mergers is likely to continue to increase as even more jurisdictions contemplate the introduction of competition laws. This level of regulation now goes beyond that required to protect national economies from potentially harmful mergers and has seen burgeoning costs to business, regulators and, ultimately, the public. In recognition of this, the relatively newly formed International Competition Network has placed merger regulation at the forefront of its agenda for greater harmonisation and cooperation in competition law. This has seen, over the past three years, the development of a set of guiding principles and recommended practices for merger notification procedures designed to reduce the regulatory burden. This article evaluates these recommendations and discusses areas for further reform.
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In 2003 the Dawson Committee, commissioned by the Government, recommended that criminal penalties should be introduced for cartel conduct. The Government accepted this recommendation in principle and set up a working party to consider the implementation difficulties that had been identified in the Dawson Report. Nothing further was heard from the Government until February 2005 when the Government announced that it would introduce criminal penalties for serious cartel conduct. This paper evaluates the Government proposals and makes suggestions for their implementation.
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Julie Clarke, 'The Dawson Report and Merger Regulation' (2003) 8(2) Deakin Law Review 245
The Dawson Report, released by the federal Government in April, recommended significant change to merger regulation in Australia. While retaining the substantial lessening of competition test, the Report calls for change to the merger clearance and authorisation processes. The recommendations have received the support of the Government and big business, but have attracted criticism from the ACCC, small business and consumer groups. This paper will critically discuss the recommendations in light of the public submissions made to the Review.
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Following the introduction of criminal sanctions, including jail terms, for hard core cartelisation in the United Kingdom, the Dawson Review has recently recommended that criminal penalties be introduced in Australia for individuals and corporations found to have engaged in hard core cartels. A number of reasons have been advanced to justify the introduction of criminal sanctions for this type of conduct, the most common of which are that it would bring Australia in line with other competition regimes and that criminal sanctions are more likely to provide an effective deterrent. This article evaluates those reasons, and others, to determine whether there is any adequate justification for the proposed criminal regime.
The Dawson Report, released by the federal Government in April, recommended significant change to merger regulation in Australia. While retaining the substantial lessening of competition test, the Report calls for change to the merger clearance and authorisation processes. The recommendations have received the support of the Government and big business, but have attracted criticism from the ACCC, small business and consumer groups. This paper will critically discuss the recommendations in light of the public submissions made to the Review.
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Philip Clarke and Julie Clarke, ‘Players, Clubs, Events and the Trade Practices Act: A Primer for Sporting Clubs’ (2003) 6(2) Sport Management Review 169-184
The Trade Practices Act (TPA) has had an enormous impact on how corporations in Australia may conduct their business. In relation to sporting clubs, it limits the freedom of clubs to deal with players, each other and the public. While previously many clubs may have escaped the ambit of the TPA because they were not "corporations", state equivalent Fair Trading legislation and the introduction of the national competition policy in 1995 have effectively expanded the scope of consumer and competition regulation to include individuals and associations. Consequently, an understanding of the nature and scope of trade practices regulation is now important for any sporting organisation – regardless of size or structure. This paper identifies the legislative provisions most likely to impact upon sporting clubs and examines some possible circumstances in which clubs might find themselves exposed to liability.
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The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has been criticised for failing to take due account of the impact import competition has on domestic firms when assessing whether or not a proposed merger will be likely to substantially lessen competition. This paper reviews the approach taken by the Commission to import competition in its merger assessments. Consideration is given to both the policy adopted by the Commission and the statistical relevance that has, in fact, been placed on import competition in merger assessment. A conclusion is then drawn as to the appropriateness of the Commission’s current policy and practice.
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Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke ‘The solution to the dilemma presented by the guilty plea discount: the qualified guilty plea - I'm pleading guilty only because of the discount ...' (2002) 30 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 51-74
he guilty plea sentencing discount is arguably a triumph of expediency over principle. Strong utilitarian reasons favour providing less severe sentences to defendants who plead guilty. However, an unsavoury by-product of the guilty plea discount is that some innocent people are pressuredinto pleading guilty. This article suggests that a possible solution to the problems caused by the discount is to permit defendants to enter a ‘qualified guilty plea’. While formally amounting to a guilty of plea, the defendant would be permitted to advance submissions consistent with innocence as part of the plea in mitigation. If the sentencer is persuaded that the defendant had a tenable chance of an acquittal a penalty discount in excess of that available for merely pleading guilty would be conferred.
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Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke, 'The Guilty Plea Discount: Why and How Much - An Analysis of Cameron' (2002) 2(3) Bourke's Criminal Law News Victoria 17
The guilty plea discount remains one of the most controversial aspects of sentencing. There are strong utilitarian reasons in favour of encouraging defendants to plead guilty. A guilty plea saves the community the expense of a contested hearing and spares witnesses the stress of giving evidence. However, the discount comes at a very price. It puts pressure on some innocent defendants to plead guilty. The High Court in Cameron v R (2002) 187 ALR 65; BC200200226; [2002] HCA 6 recently approved of the discount and in the process the majority of the court rejected the argument that it constitutes a form of discrimination against offenders who elect to pursue their “right” to a trial. This paper examines the nature of the guilty plea discount and the reasoning of the Court in Cameron.
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Julie Brebner, 'Resale Price Maintenance - The Need for Further Reform' (2001) 9 Trade Practices Law Journal 18
Abstract: The Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth) extended the resale price maintenance provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to include services, and provide for authorisation where the conduct can be shown to benefit the public such that it should be allowed. This article explores the scope of these changes and their shortcomings. It also seeks to provide some guidance as to their likely application, and makes recommendations for further reform.
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Smoking in Shopping Centres, Property Council News, August 2000, 13 (with Max Cameron)
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Julie Clarke, 'Breen v Williams: A lost opportunity or a welcome conservatism?' (1996) 3 Deakin Law Review 237 (published 1998)
The recent case of Breen v. Williams provided the High Court with an opportunity to re-evaluate the fiduciary law of this country to bring it into line with that of the Canadian jurisdiction. Canadian courts have a history of imposing positive obligations on fiduciaries in novel situations, most recently in respect of doctor-patient relationships. Such relationships, it held, were fiduciary in nature and, by virtue of this, the doctor was said to be burdened with a positive obligation to act with 'utmost good faith and loyalty' towards the patient, an incident of which was to allow patients access to their medical records. However, in a clear rejection of Canadian developments, the High Court unanimously refused to expand the nature and scope of Australian fiduciary law in such a way as to impose upon doctors such an obligation.
Conferences and seminars
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This commentary responds to a conference paper by Brent Fisse addressing limitations and complications with Australia's current cartel exceptions. It considers whether and how they might be amended to respond to these concerns.
Keywords: cartel, competition law
See also Brent Fisse, Cartel Exceptions (Competition Law Conference, 23 May 2026) (and PowerPoints)
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Panelist: ‘Digital platforms and competition in Australia’ Roundtable (Mandala, Sydney, 2 May 2025)
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Commentator: Marcus Bezzi, ‘Merger Control Law in Australia and New Zealand’ (International League of Competition Law (LIDC), e-Conference, 13 February 2025)
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Panelist: ‘Demystifying Generative AI, Competition and Markets’ (CAIDE AI Forum #3, 17 September 2024)
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Julie Clarke, ‘Proof of Purpose’ (Competition Law Conference, 6 May 2023, Sydney)
Purpose has a special role in Australian competition law. With limited exceptions, the key Australian competition law provisions can be contravened based on subjective purpose alone, without the need to establish an effect or likely effect on competition. A series of Federal Court decisions have, however, highlighted the challenges of purpose-based competition cases. They suggest that proof of purpose is becoming more challenging, fuelled by the courts' increased willingness to prefer witness testimony of ‘legitimate business justifications’ over documentary evidence suggesting anti-competitive intent.
This paper considers the role of purpose in Australian competition law and identifies and critiques the principles that have been developed to guide its interpretation. It then examines the evidentiary questions that have arisen in applying these principles before examining more closely a series of recent cases in which the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has failed to establish purpose. It concludes by examining the implications of the findings in those cases.
This paper was presented (in truncated form) at the Competition Law Conference in Sydney on 6 May 2023. -
Moderator: ‘ChatGPT: Law, legal advice and other integrity challenges’ (Seminar, Melbourne Law School, 5 April 2023)
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‘Dynamic Competition in Dynamic Markets: A Path Forward’ (Competition Policy International and Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, 2 August 2022) (host and moderator of panel session ‘The role of M&A in innovation ecosystems’)
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Commentator: Linda Evans, ‘Proposed Merger Reforms in Australia’, Competition Law Conference (21 May 2022)
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Commentator: Ariel Ezrachi, ‘How Big Tech Barons Smash Innovation’ (Baxt Lecture, 24 October 2022)
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Panel Chair: ‘Interactions between Consumer Citizens and Technology’ at Digital Citizens Conference (Melbourne Law School, July 2019)
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Interviewer: Rod Sims (ACCC Chair), ‘The Current State of Competition Law and Policy in Australia’ (16th Annual Competition Law and Economics Workshop, 12-13 October 2018)
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Presentors: Sean Ennis and Pedro Carodesousa
Commentators: Professor Caron Beaton-Wells and Associate Professor Julie Clarke
Abstract:
For much of the early part of the last decade the focus of Australian competition law and enforcement was on the introduction and implementation of a criminal regime for cartel conduct, introduced in 2009. Last year saw the first criminal sentencing of a corporation since the cartel offences became law and the first prosecution individuals has just been announced. At the same time, there has been considerable activity in enforcement of the civil penalty regime for anti-competitive conduct over the last ten years. A large number of proceedings have been brought and penalties have been secured in a substantial proportion of them. In relation to cartel conduct, the size of these penalties has increased markedly in recent years. These acknowledgements aside, with the criminal regime now bedded down, a critical review of civil penalties is now timely. Building on prior OECD work comparing sanctions for competition law infringements, Australia has asked the OECD to review its penalties regime and compare it with the practices of a number of representative OECD jurisdictions. The OECD will publish its report from the review and senior OECD representatives will present the results in Australia in March 2018, including at this Competition Law & Economics Network discussion group on 28 March. The presentation will be followed by commentary by Professor Caron Beaton-Wells and Associate Professor Julie Clarke, presenting empirical work and analysis on corporate cartel penalties over more than four decades in this country.
The OECD’s report on Australia’s pecuniary penalty regime is available here and the slides from Sean Ennis and Pedro Caro de Sousa’s presentation at the Discussion Group are available here.
A detailed paper by Caron Beaton-Wells and Julie Clarke on Australia’s corporate penalties for cartel conduct is available here and the slides from their presentation at the Discussion Group are available here.
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Julie Clarke, 'A ‘more economic approach’ to unilateral conduct laws in Australia', Research Seminar, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, Friday 9 January 2016
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The Challenge of International Merger Regulation, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London (27 Feb 2013)
The seminar will discuss the current approach to regulating transnational mergers in a competition law context. A merger is considered transnational if it has the potential to impact upon competition in more than one jurisdiction. The proliferation of pre-merger review systems over the past two decades has prompted several proposals for supranational solutions, ranging from proposals for an international law and adjudicative body to more modest proposals for soft harmonization. Although there has been an increase in the level of ‘soft’ harmonization, largely attributable to the work of the International Competition Network, significant differences remain and compliance costs continue to rise as more jurisdictions adopt pre-merger notification regimes. The seminar will identify key points of convergence and divergence between national merger regimes and discuss whether or not it is possible or desirable to further streamline the current multi-national merger review process to improve economic and social outcomes.
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International and comparative merger law; is there a need for greater convergence?', UQ Law Research Seminar Series, 7 September 2012, Brisbane
The seminar will discuss the current system of regulating multi‐jurisdictional mergers. A merger may be “multi‐jurisdictional” because the parties are located in more than one jurisdiction, or because it has the potential to impact upon competition in more than one jurisdiction. The proliferation of competition laws and the significant increase in the number of countries now imposing pre‐merger notification obligations has prompted several proposals for multi‐jurisdictional merger reform, ranging from proposals for an international law and adjudicative body to more modest proposals for soft harmonisation. To some degree, the International Competition Network has, over the last decade, facilitated greater ‘soft harmonisation’ in the national approach to merger regulation, but inefficiencies still remain. The seminar will discuss whether or not it is possible or desirable to further streamline the current multinational merger review process to improve economic and social outcomes.
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There is a clear trend towards the criminalization of ‘hard core’ antitrust cartels. Countries that have recently criminalised anti-competitive behaviour include United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa and Russia. Important questions arise regarding the appropriateness and effectiveness of extending the criminal law to this conduct. This workshop will consider whether or not cartel conduct should be treated as criminal. Standard justifications will be considered, including moral blameworthiness, the proportionality principle and general deterrence. In addition, it will consider some of the legal implications, for instance, the exposure of directors of companies to potential racketeering charges. The definition of ‘organized crime’ in the Palermo Convention will be considered as well as potential money laundering and asset forfeiture consequences.
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Trade Practices Update, 30 October 2009 (CLE Seminar, Deakin University)
This CLE seminar was part of a Deakin University/Geelong Law Association CLE program and was designed to update local practitioners on recent changes to competition and consumer laws
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Trade Practices Update, Deakin University Faculty of Business and Law, Business Breakfast, Geelong, 15 October 2008
This seminar was designed for small business people in the Geelong area and highlighted key issues in competition and consumer law relevant for small business.
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Proposed Changes to Merger Regulation in Australia, Paper presented at Australasian Law Teachers' Association Annual Conference 2003, Novotel Hotel, Brisbane, 7 July 2003
The way in which mergers are evaluated in Australia is set to undergo significant change in the coming months. The Review of the Competition Law Provisions of the Trade Practices Act (the Dawson Review) was released by the Government in April. While recommending the retention of the current substantial lessening of competition test, the Dawson Committee made a number of recommendations for change regarding the procedures to be applied in assessing potential mergers. These recommendations have received the support of the federal Government. This paper will critically discuss the recommendations of the Committee in light of the submissions made to the Review and international best practice. It will also consider the possible amendments to the TPA that may flow from the Committee’s recommendations and the likely impact of those changes.
Thesis
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The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers (PhD Thesis, Qld UT, 2010)
Transnational mergers are mergers involving firms operating in more than one jurisdiction, or which occur in one jurisdiction but have an impact on competition in another. Being of this nature, they have the potential to raise competition law concerns in more than one jurisdiction. When they do, the transaction costs of the merger to the firms involved, and the competition law authorities, are likely to increase significantly and, even where the merger is allowed to proceed, delays are likely to occur in reaping the benefits of the merger. Ultimately, these costs are borne by consumers. This thesis will identify the nature and source of regulatory costs associated with transnational merger review and identify and evaluate possible mechanisms by which these costs might be reduced. It will conclude that there is no single panacea for transnational merger regulation, but that a multi-faceted approach, including the adoption of common filing forms, agreement on filing and review deadlines and continuing efforts toward increasing international cooperation in merger enforcement, is needed to reduce regulatory costs and more successfully improve the welfare outcomes to which merger regulation is directed.
Supervisor: Stephen Corones and Helen Stacy
Keywords: merger, transnational merger, international competition network, OECD, comity
Institution: Queensland University of Technology
Reports
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Julie Clarke and Barbora Jedličková, ‘Competition issues generated by the growth of online sales platforms’ (Report for the Rio de Janeiro conference, International League of Competition Law, 2017)
In response to question: What are the major competition/anti-trust issues generated by the growth of online sales platforms, and how should they be resolved?
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Julie Clarke and Barbora Jedličková, ‘The Pharmaceutical Industry and Competition Law’ (Report for the Geneva conference, International League of Competition Law, 2016)
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Barbora Jedličková, Julie Clarke and Sitesh Bhojani, ‘The consistency and compatibility of transactional resolutions of antitrust proceedings with the due process and fundamental rights of the parties in Australia’, Report to for the Torino Congress 2014 (International League of Competition Law)
The Australian competition-law regime is primarily governed by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) and is based on both private and public enforcement. However, Australian competition law is primarily enforced and regulated publicly, by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The ACCC has investigative and information-gathering powers under Part XID of the CCA. It resolves matters either by administratively encouraging consultation or negotiation to settle disputes, or via litigation. Nevertheless, only the court has the power to declare whether particular conduct contravenes the CCA and make findings of liability. The ACCC is empowered to institute proceedings in the court for the declaration of an infringement of the CCA and for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty on behalf of the Commonwealth. The ACCC may also apply for injunctions, damages and a range of orders. ...
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Barbora Jedličková and Julie Clarke, ‘The Grocery Retail Market: Is Antitrust Efficiently Handling This Market? Australian Perspective’, Report to for the Kiev Congress 2013 (International League of Competition Law)
The Australian grocery retail market is concentrated with the major supermarket chains holding significant bargaining power. Bargaining power, particularly in the form of buyer power, has been the focus of concern in Australia in relation to the retail grocery market. Existing merger laws can assist, to a degree, in curtailing further concentration in this sector, but do not address existing power imbalances. The role of Australia’s abuse of power provisions in addressing some of the concerns associated with supermarket buyer power is regularly debated in Australia, but to date abuse of power provisions have not been a significant feature of competition law enforcement with respect to the supermarket industry. A proposed new code of conduct may address several issues such as delisting of suppliers, lower payments and other unilateral changes to concluded supply agreements. These issues arise from imbalances in the negotiation of supply between the major retailers and their suppliers.
Submissions to reviews/inquiries
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The Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Bill 2016 (the Bill) would, if passed, give effect to the substance of the Harper Report’s recommendation on misuse of market power. The proposed new provision is better aligned with the objectives of the law than the one it will replace. Importantly, it will address the two key deficiencies in the current law (the take advantage element and the exclusive focus on conduct having the purpose of harming competitors) which have prevented it from operating as intended.
Recommendation: the Committee should recommend passage of the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Bill 2016
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Institute of Public Accountants, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics Inquiry into the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Bill 2016 (January 2017) (prepared with Philip Clarke as part of the IPA Deakin University SME Research Partnership)
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Institute of Public Accountants, Submission Australian Consumer Law Review Interim Report, October 2016 (prepared with Philip Clarke as part of the IPA Deakin University SME Research Partnership)
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Institute of Public Accountants, Submission to Treasury inquiry on Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Bill 2016 (Exposure Draft) , October 2016 (prepared as part of the IPA Deakin University SME Research Partnership)
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Submission to Competition Policy Review 2014-2015 (Harper Review) on Draft Report (November 2014)
“The Competition Policy Review Panel’s Draft Report contains a number of commendable recommendations for the reform and simplification of Australia’ competition laws. This submission focusses on some of the key proposals relating to the competition law provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act.”
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Institute of Public Accountants, Submission to the Treasury on Options to strengthen the misuse of market power law, February 2016 (prepared as part of the IPA Deakin University SME Research Partnership)
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Julie Brebner, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review (Dawson Committee), July 2002
“This submission relates to Term of Reference 1(a) and is limited to a consideration of the merger provisions of the Trade Practices Act (‘TPA’). In particular, it relates to whether the current merger laws ‘inappropriately impede the ability of Australian industry to compete locally and internationally’.”
Media, commentary and edited blogs
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Eleanor Tyler, ‘Australia’s Antitrust Regulator Clashes With Tribunal on Merger Review’ (Bloomberg, 13 July 2017)
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Charles McConnell, ‘ACCC pursues healthcare provider for alleged abuse of dominance’ (GCR 2 May 2017) (quoted)
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ABC, PM, 'Farmers urge Government to stay the course on competition law reform'
Interview with Clint Jasper, 6 September 2016
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'This week’s successful prosecution of airlines Jetstar and Virgin Australia by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission comes after the regulator warned it would crack down on drip pricing.'
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'ACCC Chairman Rod Sims has put drip pricing in online markets on the regulator’s hit list for the year ahead, warning there would “shortly be enforcement in this area”. It’s a welcome and overdue move.'
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Kirsten Robb, ‘Bearing distributor slapped with $3 million fine for price fixing’, Smart Company, 14 May 2014 (quoted)
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'In the lead-up to the introduction of the carbon tax on July 1, there has been considerable focus on the potential for price gouging – inflating prices beyond the cost increases reasonably attributable to the tax. In recent days, this has been fuelled by a letter sent to small business from the opposition, urging them to place flyers in their shops apologising for any carbon-tax related price increases.'
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Article by Olivia Fens, 2 April 2011, featured in the News Mail (page 8), Gympie Times (page 34), Northern Star (page 8), Toowoomba Chronicle (page 26), Daily News (page 17), Fraser Coast Chronicle (p 22), Daily Mercury (p 10), Queensland Times (p 47) and Gladstone Observer (p 22). See also 'Milk war is not all beer and skittles' (article by Olivia Fens, 2 April 2011, Sunshine Coast Daily, page 42)
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Emily Chantiri, 'Handshake Hassles', Business Review Weekly, 28 January 2010, page 48
'Whether you're a small operator or a large company, entering into contract negotiations has become part of everyday business. Some business arrangements may be simple enough for a business person to draft, while others may require the help of a legal adviser. Regardless of whether it's a phone contract or a multimillion-dollar commercial contract, the fundamentals remain the same ...'
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The World Today with Peter Cave, Radio Interview with Ashley Hall, Monday 29 June 2009 at 12.52pm
(ACCC action against Cabcharge – pre-recorded)
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Julie Clarke, 'Review Misses Bill's Key Points', Australian Financial Review, Tuesday 21 April 2009, p 63 (opinion piece)
'The Senate economics committee recommended on February 26 that the Senate pass the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Bill 2008 ("criminal cartel bill") without amendment. The recommendation to criminalise cartels is welcome, but the report is disappointing.'
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The World Today with Peter Cave, Radio Interview with Ashley Hall, Monday 29 June 2009 at 12.52pm
Discussing ACCC action against Cabcharge
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Jason Bryce, 'Suppression of bank payments festers for eBay', The Sheet (8 July 2008) (quote)
'Confusion and anger continues to rain down on eBay Australia from its own devotees. eBay discussion boards are full of sellers not wanting to have to offer PayPal if they don’t choose to. That change was introduced by eBay on 21 May as the first part of the now abandoned project to make eBay.com.au a marketplace where PayPal was the only acceptable payment mechanism (either in its own right, or with PayPal acting as gateway for a credit card payment).'
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Jason Bryce, 'Australia the Testing Ground for eBay', The Sheet (20 May 2008) (quote)
'Australia’s almost unique competition laws are allowing eBay to test their plan for PayPal-only payments without fear of prosecution.'
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Jason Bryce, 'eBay's PayPal plan sparks user revolt', Courier Mail (18 May 2008) (quote)
'The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has been flooded with submissions opposing eBay Australia's proposal to force buyers and sellers to use its subsidiary PayPal to handle payments.'
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Tony Raggatt, 'Reforms pose discount risk' Townsville Bulletin (Thursday 20 September 2007) p 43
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Mark Fenton-Jones, ‘TPA bill fails small business’ The Australian Financial Review (Tuesday 10 July 2007) pp 47 and 49
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'The George and Paul Show’ with George Moore and Paul B Kidd, 8.15am Saturday 25 August 2007, Radio 2UE, Sydney (live interview)
Discussion of petrol inquiry
Book Reviews
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Julie Clarke, Comments on Blog Symposium - Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement, Antitrust and Competition Policy Blog, 17 May 2011.
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Julie Clarke, 'Book Review: Australian Cartel Regulation: Law, Policy and Practice in an International Context by Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse' (2011) 18(3) Competition and Consumer Law Journal 299
Disclaimer
The information contained in this profile has been complied from publicly. While care has been taken to ensure information is accurate, it is possible that some information may be inaccurate, incomplete or out of date.